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rs)投資銀行最近的宣告倒閉，尋求破產保護，以及一連同志色教館串的從美國傳出來的黑色金融消息，其危險性及震撼對全球同志色教館任何稍有儲蓄或投資的人都有關，當然也影響到台灣的每一同志色教館個人，尤其是閒閒的股票族，那更是損失慘重。 下面這篇是同志色教館2008 09 16由一位極富盛名的美國經濟專欄作家Ro同志色教館震撼對全球任何稍有儲蓄或投資的人都有關，當然也影響到台灣的每一個人，尤其是閒閒的股票族，那更是損失慘重。 下面這篇是2008 09 16由一位極富盛名的美國經濟專欄作家Robert Samuelson在華盛頓郵報的評論。Ajin特地翻出來分享各位網友，好讓大家有一定知識，到底來龍去脈，整個全球自由經濟市常的運作是如何？錢到底如何億來億去，最後泡沫化。 根據此文，Robert Samuelson手指的最大原因是歸咎於1980年代美國開始提出金融市場的放寬及除管制化(De-regulation)政策，其目的是要刺激金融市場的開放競爭。（有關這政策的背後的理論主張與學派，Ajin希望另找個機會來與大家討論。） 金融業除管制化的政策，可說是把資本主義的市場經濟帶到史前未有的境界，結果銀行可以賣保險，保險業可以開銀行借貸儲放，甚至容許任何所謂的金融機構，對相關任何金融產品都可以經營銷售。因此，我們看見近幾十年，任何大公司也相繼推出過去僅是銀行界壟斷的信用卡業務。 結果，金融本身由一個貨品交換的媒介，價值的處存，價值的度量衡單位，變成一個可以交易的貨品，這已經是將資本主義無限上綱到極限了。然而如此是否妥當？美國金融是否恢復過去嚴格控管？或只是因為放任經濟的真髓還沒有被徹底掌握，以致於玩起來，大家受傷？這些議題不但牽連的你、我，台灣、美國，及全球，也牽連到明天之後的薪水，物價，以及頭路工作。 這問題有解嗎？ 打盹的哲學家說：「愛濃濃 (I don’t know）」 Wall Street's Unraveling http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/16/AR2008091602877.html?wpisrc=newsletter&wpisrc=newsletter&wpisrc=newsletter 華爾街的癱瘓 ◆ Ajin 譯 我們知道華爾街這下很可能是完蛋了。 並不只是因美國銀行(Bank of America)答允購買美林(Merrill Lynch) 或那個傳奇性的萊曼兄弟投資銀行(Lehman Brothers)申請破產，或巨型保險公司AIG的踉蹌步伐。這些事件甚至也不是因先前的投資銀行倍爾史登（Bear Stearns）的週轉不靈，或政府的收購最大的貸款公司范妮美（Fannie Mae），以及費得力馬克 （Freddie Mac）所導致。到底真的發生何事致使華爾街的商業模式徹底癱瘓？ Wall Street as we know it is kaput. It is not just that Merrill Lynch agreed to be purchased by Bank of America or that the legendary investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy or that the insurance giant AIG is floundering. It is not even that these events followed the failure of the investment bank Bear Stearns or the government's takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest mortgage lenders. What's really happened is that Wall Street's business model has collapsed. 定期掌管金融市場的兩大因素：貪婪和恐懼，早就種下這全球危機的種子了，只是不清楚何時將發酵而已。然而，充滿巨大的投資公司，證券經紀公司，基金公司和私有資產公司的華爾街，在1980之後確定是變質了。以目前的業務模型具有三個基本元件。 Greed and fear, which routinely govern financial markets, have seeded this global crisis. Just when it will end isn't clear. What is clear is that its origins lie in the ways that Wall Street -- the giant investment houses, brokerage firms, hedge funds and "private equity" firms -- has changed since 1980. Its present business model has three basic components. 首先，金融投資顧問公司參與超出其傳統角色：如顧問和仲介。 過去主要投資銀行如萊曼，戈爾德曼薩克斯（Goldman Sachs）的工作，只為他們的主要顧客服務 - 他們為金融公司操作投資 (保險公司退休金撥款，互惠基金）的主要機構投資者，買賣股票和債券；他們替商業機構尋提出營運企畫，尋找資金，背書，銷售新股票和債券； 他們向要合併、 收購和轉讓的企業客戶提供意見。他們從這些服務賺取費用。 First, financial firms have moved beyond their traditional roles as advisers and intermediaries. Once, major investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Lehman worked mainly for their clients. They traded stocks and bonds for major institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds). They raised capital for companies by underwriting -- selling -- new stocks and bonds for the firms. They provided advice to corporate clients on mergers, acquisitions and spinoffs. All these services earned fees. 現在，大多數金融公司亦為自己投資。 他們使用夥伴或股東的錢來放置投注有關股票、 債券和其它證券—就是所謂"主要交易"。 一向為個別客戶服務的美林以及其它零售經紀從此也轉進變成投資銀行。 有一些商業銀行，過去是被禁止這樣做的，直到1999年廢除1933年所定的格拉斯斯蒂高爾條例，才開放。 Now, most financial firms also invest for themselves. They use partners' or shareholders' money to place bets on stocks, bonds and other securities -- so-called "principal transactions." Merrill and other retail brokers, which once served individual clients, have ventured into investment banking. So have some commercial banks that were barred from doing so until the repeal in 1999 of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 第二，華爾街的金額獎賞是傾向於每年年終的大量分紅，用以反映經紀人與資金運作經理在全年度內賺取的利潤。儘管有基本薪金，但每年的分紅卻變成是黃袍加身的主宰。 一個具有15年經驗的經營董事可以收到分紅是他們 20萬到30萬元基本薪酬的五至十倍。 Second, Wall Street's compensation is heavily skewed toward annual bonuses, reflecting the profits traders and managers earned in the year. Despite lavish base salaries, bonuses dominate. Managing directors with 15 years' experience can receive bonuses five to 10 times their base salaries of $200,000 to $300,000. 最後，投資銀行依賴借錢，在財務術語中稱為"槓桿操作"。萊曼就是最典型的。2007年底它擁有幾乎7000億股票、 債券和其它證券。此外，其股東投資 (資產）是約為230億元。所有其他資產都是從的借款得到支援。 槓桿比是 30：1。 Finally, investment banks rely heavily on borrowed money, called "leverage" in financial lingo. Lehman was typical. In late 2007, it held almost $700 billion in stocks, bonds and other securities. Meanwhile, its shareholders' investment (equity) was about $23 billion. All the rest was supported by borrowings. The "leverage ratio" was 30 to 1. "槓桿操作"可以造成的龐大橫財。 假設您購買股票$100元。當股價上漲到$110，你是得到合理回報10%。 現在假設 $100中的 $90是借來的，如果價格上升到 $101，對您 ＄10元投資，你就已經賺了10%。（技術尚而言，股價有要稍微超逾 $101才能貼補利息）。 如果股價是$110，那你原來的$10本錢是賺了100%，因它變成一倍了。 哇！ Leverage can create huge windfalls. Suppose you buy a stock for $100. It goes to $110. You made 10 percent, a decent return. Now suppose you borrowed $90 of the $100. If the price rises to $101, you've made 10 percent on your $10 investment. (Technically, the price has to exceed $101 slightly to cover interest payments.) If it goes to $110, you've doubled your money. Wow. "槓桿操作"一旦上路成為機制，這將變成有如瘋狂的賭博機制。經紀人，業界和財務經理有足夠他人的錢可運用及龐大的誘因，來從事任何會增加短期利潤的操作。連一般超短路的投機者，也會爭先恐後地沈淪於債券的出售，買賣中。投資公司因此有龐大的誘因來增加"槓桿操作"。 當經濟蓬勃持續時，政府保持沈默不吭聲，國會也因此拒絕給Fannie and Freddie更嚴格的控管，甚至容許他們運用"槓桿操作"的比率加大，大到超過 60： 1。 Once assembled, these components created a manic machine for gambling. Traders and money managers had huge incentives to do whatever would increase short-term profits. Dubious mortgages were packaged into bonds, sold and traded. Investment houses had huge incentives to increase leverage. While the boom continued, government remained aloof. Congress resisted tougher regulation for Fannie and Freddie and permitted them to run leverage ratios that, by plausible calculations, exceeded 60 to 1. 並不是華爾街的大玩家刻意要欺騙客戶，致使他們冒險地貸款到危險程度。 而是他們認為風險相對的低或不存在。他們矇騙自己，是因為短期的獎勵使他們盲目，看不見長期的危險。不可避免，崩盤出現了。房屋貸款出紕漏了，強大且高比例的"槓桿操作"邏輯進入反向，虧損侵蝕到公司的小額資本基地，這下生存的問題就出現了。今年，萊曼在主要交易上虧損了接近 80億元。 否則，是盈利。 It wasn't that Wall Street's leaders deceived customers or lenders into taking risks that were known to be hazardous. Instead, they concluded that risks were low or nonexistent. They fooled themselves, because the short-term rewards blinded them to the long-term dangers. Inevitably, these surfaced. Mortgages went bad. The powerful logic of high leverage went into reverse. Losses eroded firms' tiny capital bases, raising doubts about their survival. This year, Lehman lost nearly $8 billion in "principal transactions." Otherwise, it was profitable. 華爾街如何轉型，目前並不明確。公司需要更多資金，美林找上美國銀行（BOA）是因為商業銀行有低的 "槓桿操作" 比例 (大約 10：1）。此後，很可能許多稀薄資本的基金，會被強迫降低"槓桿操作"比例，這同時也會應用到「私人資產」公司的。短時間內，這措施會顯出有利，至少可以讓金融公司減少愚蠢及浪費的風險。雄心勃勃金融專業人士，可能會從財務專業往以效率取向的其他行業移動。 How Wall Street restructures itself is as yet unclear. Companies need more capital. Merrill went to Bank of America because commercial banks have lower leverage (about 10 to 1). It seems likely that many thinly capitalized hedge funds will be forced to reduce leverage. Ditto for "private equity" firms. In time, all this may prove beneficial. Financial firms may take fewer stupid and wasteful risks -- at least for a while. Talented and ambitious people may move from finance, where they were attracted by exorbitant pay, into more productive industries. 但立刻遭到影響的是其他已遭到破壞的經濟，人們已失去工作，尤其是紐約和新 澤西州的居民，他們的經濟是取決於華爾街的利潤。他們將會比其他地區更進一步地削減開銷。 銀行和投資銀行可能再次收緊貸款標準，但這將導致任何經濟更緩慢復蘇。股票市場的低迴盪必定加深消費者悲觀，恐懼和消費意願。很難知道是否還有更多財務公司也近期內會產生週轉不靈的狀況。畢竟金融危機與戰爭有個非常相似的面像，就是計算錯誤所導致。 But the immediate effect may be to damage the rest of the economy. People have already lost their jobs. States and localities, particularly New York City and New Jersey , that depend on Wall Street's profits and payrolls will face further spending cuts. Banks and investment banks may tighten lending standards again and impede any economic recovery. The stock market's swoon may deepen consumers' pessimism, fear and reluctance to spend. There may be more failures of financial firms. It's hard to know, because financial crises resemble wars in one crucial respect: They result from miscalculation.